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On regression sampling in Statistical Auditing: 
bad answers to the wrong questions? 
Aart F. de Vos, June 1989 
Auditing is a fascinating area for statistics. Auditors have to 
judge populations of book values. With restricted means they must 
find out whether statements about such populations are sound or not. 
Moreover, year after year hundreds of thousands more or less similar 
populations must be judged. An important part in making those 
judgements is played by the drawing of samples of booked items, 
checking whether these are correct (equal to the audit values), and 
deriving from this information statements about the state of the 
total population. 
One would expect that an optimal statistical solution of this 
problem has been developed. After all it concerns a relatively 
simple problem and huge costs of wrong procedures are involved. The 
true state of affairs, however, is that statisticians propose widely 
diverging methods and discord among them prevails. 
How is it possible that the statisticians get so many different 
answers? I think simply because they do not agree about the 
questions. Some statisticians even argue that mainstream statistics 
tends to concentrate on the wrong questions. I share that view and 
think that Bayesian statistics, and in the case of auditing 
specifically Empirical Bayesian statistics, provide answers to more 
relevant questions. In de Vos (1989a) this view is developed and 
illustrated. 
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I will argue that the recent article "regression sampling in 
statistical auditing" by Kleijnen, Kriens, Timmermans and Van den 
Wildenberg (1989), KKTW in short, is an example of a paper giving 
bad answers to the wrong questions. That is not as bad as it might 
seem: a bad answer to a wrong question may be a better approximation 
of a good answer to a right question than a good answer to a wrong 
question. 
Answering the wrong questions is a fundamental problem of classical 
(frequentist) statistical theory. I will show how KKTW indirectly 
give evidence for this statement. They condemn a classical procedure 
which is based on a more or less correct model and suggest a 
procedure which is based on an obviously inferior (regression) 
model. That the latter works well is because it resembles a Bayesian 
version of a good model and because KKTW in evaluating the 
performance of the procedures in real-life situations come closer 
(but not too close) to answering the good - Bayesian - question. 
The structure of the present paper is as follows. First the 
methodology and results of KKTW are reviewed. A short explanation is 
given of the central problem in audit research, with as central 
element the need of prior information since samples are not 
informative enough. Next the attention is focused on inference. 
Classical (frequentist) solutions are criticized as giving 
irrelevant answers. The Bayesian approach is explained and it is 
discussed what classical model-based solutions mean from a Bayesian 
viewpoint. It is argued that only very restricted models lead to 
satisfactory results, the restriction being a type of prior 
information. But this classical "prior" is motivated strongly by the 
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need to get manageable models, whereas in the Bayesian context 
(subjective or objective) outside Information is used. KKTW 
illustrates clearly what may be the result of this wrong motivation 
in choosing prior information. In the appendix it is explained why 
KKTW get their results and how better results might be obtained. 
Some remarks on the position of this paper in the ongoing paradigm 
debate between Bayesian and classical (frequentist) statisticians 
(see e.g. Efron (1985) and his commentators) may be useful. I am 
increasingly convinced that Bayesian analysis answers the right 
questions in general, and in auditing in particular. 
Two aspects make the audit example specifically suited to illustrate 
the Bayesian viewpoints in a way that may even be acceptable to 
those who do not share the Bayesian views. First, there is no 
satisfying classical solution to the "rare error problem": the need 
to estimate the distribution of occurring errors (beside their 
frequency), while in most samples very few errors occur. Second, the 
Bayesian solution to the problem may be implemented in terms of 
Empirical Bayesian analysis, where the subjective Bayesian prior is 
replaced by a more or less objective one, based on data from 
different similar situations (see Morris (1983), de Vos (1989a)). 
Empirical Bayesian analysis is accepted by non-Bayesians, and one 
may stop there or take the step towards a real Bayesian view which 
uses priors even when this cannot be based on empirical evidence. 
The study of KKTW offers a nice example of the argument that 
classical model building induces wrongly motivated prior 
information. This argument is rather general but not often used in 
the literature. It is more specific than the traditional "prior 
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information matters", classified by Berger (1986), in his survey of 
Bayesian arguments to convert frequentists, as helpful, but non-
compelling. 
The methodology of audit research. 
The methodology of KKWT is, just like e.g. Neter and Godfrey 
(1985), representative for mainstream statistical research on 
auditing. This approach may be described as follows: 
-Take a diversity of populations with different error structures 
(the "Neter populations", described in Neter and Loebbecke (1975)). 
This "superpopulation" is not meant to be representative, it does 
not say how likely different situation are, it just indicates the 
possibilities, that is to say, the possibilities according to Neter. 
-Take a number of rules that transpose sample outcomes into 
confidence intervals, typically said to cover the true error rate in 
95% of the cases. The rules to calculate confidence intervals are 
derived from models, that are admittedly more or less crude 
approximations of reality. 
-For each population and each rule do the following: 
draw a number of samples from each population and compare the 
quality of the confidence intervals implied by the rules: a) compute 
the proportion of cases in which they cover the true error rate; 
this should be 95% and b) compute the average length. 
-Look at the tables thus obtained and hope that some method is 
uniformly best. If not, discuss the tables and argue which model you 
think best and why. 
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The crucial aspect of this methodology is that oversimplifying 
assumptions are made to obtain manageable models, which is 
compensated by looking how the resulting inference works in 
populations that may not be described by the same models. 
The results of KKTW 
Proceeding as described above, KKWT obtain some clear results. 
Regression procedures, using the samples to make probability 
statements on book values given the audit values, outperform two 
other procedures. Less clear is the distinction between three 
different estimators of confidence intervals associated with 
regression-type models. All three perform about equally well, the 
"Jackknifed" (a trick reducing bias) estimator performing slightly 
better than the other estimators '. Altogether the results are not 
particularly impressive. As I will argue the regression procedures 
are poorly motivated, and of the two "beaten" methods one is 
obviously inf erior and the other a "good answer to the wrong 
question". 
The inferior method only uses audit values in the sample to make 
confidence statements on the mean audit value in the population. 
That this method is inferior is no surprise: book values and audit 
values are obviously strongly correlated, so the inference should be 
conditional upon the book values. The most natural things to look at 
are the errors in the sample, not the audit values. 
l)That Jackknifing helps is not as obvious as KKWT suggest. Their 
tables 7 and 8 are, for population 1 at least, strongly in favour of 
the jackknife. In view of table 4 however this may partly be 
attributed to aggregation. In population 2 the jackknife is too 
conservative, contrary to table 4. 
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The second method that is outperformed by the regression methods, is 
based on a model by Roberts (1970). KKTW call this model "difficult 
to understand intuitively" and pay little attention to it in view of 
its inferior performance. In my view a much more fundamental issue 
is at stake: the impossibility to obtain "reasonable" classical 
confidence intervals in the rare error case, described below. 
Characteristics of audit popuiations 
A main aspect of audit samples is that errors are rare. Most audit 
values are equal to the corresponding book values. Models that 
explieitly use this fact (like that of Roberts) are in principle 
superior to the regression model. Models for rare errors consider 
two aspects of a sample: the percentage of items containing some 
error, and the distribution of an error once there is one. But as in 
many samples few errors are found, it is often difficult to estimate 
the second part of the model. As a result confidence intervals are 
very large in the case of few errors. This ref lects the fact that 
one cannot exclude the case that errors are rare but huge. Audit 
samples are simply not informative enough to do so. There is no 
solution to this apart from using prior information. The natural way 
to do so is to use Bayesian priors that consider huge errors 
unlikely. The evaluation of the Neter populations that do not 
contain huge errors should then give good results. In the context of 
the model of Cox and Snell (1979), that is based on rare errors and 
an exponential distribution for those errors that occur, the problem 
of large intervals in case of few errors also arises. Godfrey and 
Neter (1984) and Neter and Godfrey (1985) indeed find that 
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confidence intervals based on informative priors perform well in the 
Neter populations. 
A pseudo-solution 
As the problem is put above, a solution might be to repeat the KKTW 
study using the more appropriate "rare error regression" model 
(discussed further in the appendix) 
y^ = Xj_ with probability 1-p 
y^ = a + bx^ + u- with probability p 
Uj_ distributed IN(0,CT2) 
with informative priors for a, b and o. Mimicking of Neter and 
Godfrey (1985) would come down to experimenting with these priors 
until the resulting "Bayesian" confidence intervals would, for all 
Neter populations, cover the true error rate in 95% of the samples. 
This goal is unattainable, but without any doubt it could be reached 
closer than by KKTW. The proposed procedure is more flexible and, as 
shown in the appendix, the prior implicitly used by performing 
simple regression on all values is rather curious. 
This methodology of Godfrey and Neter, however, is hybrid. They do 
not use prior information in the Bayesian sense, but lend the 
Bayesian possibilities to construct a "robust" estimator in the 
classical sense. As robustness is defined as good performance in the 
Neter populations, one might say that these populations are 
indirectly used to construct a prior. The Bayesian priors have no 
function except generating "rules for confidence intervals" that 
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perform well for these populations. In addition "performing well" is 
not well defined; how to weigh the length of confidence intervals 
and the unavoidable cases where the confidence intervals have no 95% 
coverage remains somewhat obscure. 
Another, more fundamental, objection against the Godrey and Neter 
methodology is that the frequentist evaluation of Bayesian rules 
does not answer the question "what is known about the possible error 
rates given the sample outcome?". This is the right question and it 
may be answered once one has a model and priors for its parameters. 
So why answer other questions once priors are admitted? Why stick to 
confidence intervals with 95% coverage whatever the true situation? 
These may seem fruitful but - as I will argue - they only make sense 
if they may be interpreted the Bayesian way, which is not always the 
case. 
The Bayesian and classical objects of inference 
It seems to me that auditors would like to know: given a sample 
outcome, how likely it is that things are badly wrong? This is the 
only information suited for decisions based on cost-benefit 
considerations. Once one has probability statements on the possible 
error rates Lindley's (1985) "maximization of expected utility" may 
be performed, involving in the audit case approval, disapproval or 
search continuation, the optimal action depending on the cost of 
drawing samples, approval of populations with high error rates and 
so on. Examples are given in de Vos (1989a). 
Classical statistical methods do not say höw likely error rates are 
but answer the question: "if things are badly wrong, how likely is 
it that one will discover this?" The word "likely" in this question 
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has a meaning that differs from the same word in the Bayesian 
question. It now refers to different samples at the same error rate. 
Moreover the probability level has to be chosen in advance, though 
researchers tend to adjust their "P-values" to the sample outcomes. 
The relation between the classical and Bayesian statements becomes 
clear from Bayes' rule. In a quite general setting the elements are: 
C the characteristics of a population 
S the sample statistics 
P(C) the prior distribution of the characteristics (for Bayesians 
only) 
Bayes' rule says: 
P(C|S) = P(C)P(S|C) / [Sc P(C)P(S|C)] (1) 
And may be used in an amazing variety of settings. P(S|C) may always 
be calculated for any C, analytically or by simulation. So, once a 
prior P(C) is assumed, it is possible to calculate P(C|S), the 
denominator in (1) being just a scaling factor. 
If prior probabilities are given to the Neter populations, Bayes' 
rule gives, for any sample, the posterior probability that the 
sample comes from each of the populations.' And if one is only 
interested in probability statements for the error rate, these may 
be derived straightforward from the error rates in the populations. 
Likewise, for any statistical model with a prior for the parameters, 
Bayes' rule gives the posterior distribution of all parameters, 
given the sample. It is important to notice that there is very 
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little difference with the previous situation. The prior must 
describe what populations one considers how likely. The model, 
including priors, is simply a stylized version of the case with 
separate populations. Again, conversion from the posterior of C (now 
a continuous distribution) to the posterior for the error rate is no 
problem. 
As the analysis has no snags, one may concentrate on finding good 
models. One may even try to f ind good priors, if one can observe 
many similar situations, like in auditing. Empirical Bayesian 
inference is the result; a true expert system based on a large 
database, which says how often high error rates or large errors 
occur. 
In a classical analysis the existence of P(C) is denied, and one 
only has P(S|C). But still one is interested in C, or more specific 
in some aspect of C the error rate. As C is in frequentist eyes non-
stochastic, classical inference concentrates on aspects of the 
distribution P(S|C) which have a relation with C that holds 
"uniformly", i.e. for all C. This, however, is only possible for 
some aspects and under rather restrictive assumptions. Weak 
statements like unbiased estimation of the error rate are easily 
established, but stronger statements like confidence intervals for 
the error rate require rather restrictive assumptions: only for 
rather special models confidence intervals with uniform (i.e. for 
all C) coverage of say 95% exist. Moreover, conversion of statements 
about C to statements about the error rate may involve problems. And 
finally, even if one has made enough assumptions to ensure that, 
whatever the characteristics, 95% confidence intervals for the error 
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rate may be given, this still does not enable one to derive a 
satisfactory statistical decision procedure. 
Concluding, the cost of avoiding a prior to remain "objective" are 
high: messy inference is the result. 
Confidence intervals 
The confidence interval may be seen as the classical trial to make 
something that looks like a probability statement on the item one is 
interested in (the error rate) . lts definition as a true value 
between stochastic bounds that are known after drawing the sample is 
in Bayesian eyes a conundrum (the wrecking description by Leamer 
(1978, p27) is particularly recommended). 
As confidence intervals give limited information (an interval 
instead of a distribution) that depends on an unknown truth, the 
link with decisions is not quite clear. C. It is not amazing that 
misunderstandings result. KKTW give a nice example. 
Confidence intervals may be used in two ways in auditing. First one 
may approve the population if "no error" is in the interval, 
corresponding with the test of this hypothesis with a prechosen type 
I error probability. This is what KKTW suggest. But no error is not 
an interesting hypothesis in auditing. One might sometimes be 
interested in the hypothesis that the error is small, but even then 
there is a big difference between the type I error and the evidence 
against this hypothesis (Berger (1987)). 
The second possibility to use confidence intervals uses the 
complement: no approval when some gauge (e.g. 6% error) is in the 
confidence interval. One than may say that error rates of 6% or 
higher lead in at most 5% of the cases to approval. This is an 
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answer that corresponds much better with audit purposes. It does not 
fit in cost-benefit considerations, however. And it is easily 
confused with the statement "in the acceptation case (6% being 
outside the interval) the probability that there is an error of 6% 
or higher, is 5%". This is a completely different statement that 
only can be made in a Bayesian context. Consider 
High: the event "the error rate is higher than 6%" 
Accept: the event "a 6% error rate is not in the confidence 
interval", 
than Bayes' rule says: 
P(High|Accept)«P(Accept|High)*P(High)/P(Accept) (2) 
And in normal audit cases P(High) will be small while P(Accept) is 
almost one ' . So there is a big difference between P(High|Accept) 
and P(Accept|High). As these probabilities are easily confused, even 
by professional statisticians, one may doubt whether practitioners 
can make proper use of confidence intervals. It should be noted that 
the left hand side of (2) follows from a Bayesian confidence 
interval which may differ strongly from the classical interval when 
prior information like low probabilities for high error rates is 
available. 
2) In modern auditing a variant of (2) is popular, risk analysis, 
aiming at a low P(High and Accept) , so not incorporating the 
denominator at the right hand side. See de Vos (1989b) for a 
discussion of the different methods. 
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So classical and Bayesian inference differ fundamentally in the 
sense that they answer different questions. One of the reasons that 
this is not fully realized by many statisticians is a Bayesian 
school of inference giving similarly looking answers to these 
different questions. This is the school that uses noninformative 
priors; Box and Tiao (1973) is their bible. The results are well 
known: for many Standard statistical models there exist parallel 
classical and Bayesian results. In particular sometimes confidence 
intervals look the same, only what is random differs. 
Noninformative priors offer a beautiful alternative to classical 
inference, but the parallels are misleading. A noninformative prior 
is a contradiction in itself. It is useful to show that classical 
inference has a Bayesian interpretation, but for a Bayesian a 
noninformative prior simply approximates the situation where the 
data are very informative compared to the prior. This requires many 
data rather than noninformative priors. 
Maybe the only justification for frequentist intervals is the 
metaphor: often the intervals make sense because they have a 
Bayesian parallel. And thus one thinks that they always make sense. 
But the Bayesian parallel only exists if a restrictive model is 
assumed, and is only relevant if the data are very informative about 
the parameters of this model. Classical model building may to a 
large extent be motivated this way. One restricts the possibilities 
one is prepared to consider, in order to be able to construct 
confidence intervals that make sense. But this requires simple 
models, which explains why models that are much too restrictive are 
used in auditing and other fields. 
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The role of models 
The mere existence of classical -small sample- confidence intervals 
depends heavily on the assumptions made. In a simple setting, where 
only the number of errors found matters, this is no problem. By 
using e.g. the Poisson distribution the number of errors in the 
sample is a sufficiënt statistic for the error rate in the 
population. Therefore "uniformly" (for all possible error rates) 
valid confidence intervals may be given. 
In the more complex setting, where also the distribution of the 
(rare) errors matters, it requires very restricted models to find a 
function of the data in the sample that is so directly related to 
the error rate that confidence intervals may be derived. Typically 
it requires models with a small number of sufficiënt statistics 
(regression, Poisson, Cox-Snell). Assuming such a model is nothing 
but assuming that the populations considered are well-behaved. 
Bayesians argue that this "yoke of sufficiency" (Box and Tiao (1973, 
p 65) is a typical product of the wrong approach in classical 
statistics; in the Bayesian approach sufficiënt statistics are 
convenient but not essential; similar models, differing in the 
number of sufficiënt statistics, lead to similar (Bayesian) 
conclusions. 
The impossibility to derive classical confidence intervals in 
general is best illustrated by an example. This example also 
illustrates an important difference between Bayesian and classical 
inference: 
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Assume a number of populations with normal error percentages. In 199 
out of 200 these errors are spread among a reasonable number of 
items but once in 200 times a population occurs where everything is 
perfect, except for a huge understatement in only one item. If this 
is the case, the estimated error percentage will increase with the 
number of errors found in a sample, but finding no errors in a 
reasonably large sample is an indication that one might be dealing 
with one of those populations containing one huge error. In a 
Bayesian analysis this aspect may be incorporated by including the 
aberration population in the prior with a probability of 1/200 the 
posterior probability of the aberration will be high when no errors 
are found. In the classical construction of confidence intervals 
something goes wrong: no longer "finding as many errors as have been 
found or more" is a decreasing function of the actual error rate. 
Note by the way that the example may be realistic: in some cases of 
fraud extra care may be taken to make as few "normal" errors as 
possible to mislead the auditors. 
This example may be extreme. Many less extreme cases however are 
excluded by considering only the class of models that permit 
calculation of confidence intervals. And if one succeeds in finding 
a model that is sufficiently rich to be realistic and permits 
construction of a pivotal quantity for the error rate, this quantity 
will in general contain parameters that may not be estimated with 
reasonable accuracy. Broad confidence intervals (unless priors are 
used) will be the result. In auditing there is no escape from this 
dilemma for classical confidence intervals '. Even describing the 
Neter populations with a model permitting reasonable inference seems 
impossible. 
Faced with this impossibility KKTW have, like others, chosen a quite 
remarkable solution. They simply use a model that lends itself for 
the construction of confidence intervals, without bothering about 
its realism. The regression model is one of those models with as 
many sufficiënt statistics as parameters. Though the Neter 
populations show a much more complex behaviour KKTW still use 
probability statements based on the regression model and look 
whether these hold approximately in the Neter populations. 
It seems to me that, once one admits that the statistical models one 
uses are wrong, there is not much need to use models at all. 
Attaching probabilities the Neter population, and using Bayes' rule 
seems preferable. 
To retain any belief in model building as a tooi in the evaluation 
of sampling results, decent models will have to be developed. I 
think that this is a fruitful and feasible task, in the end more 
fruitful than just inventing, as Neter did, some populations. But 
these models must reflect the essential characteristics of audit 
populations, specifically the f act that errors are rare. This 
implies that most samples will not be informative enough to permit 
classical evaluation of confidence intervals, but it is better to 
acknowledge this explicitly than to hide it behind a badly 
3)This has lead in practice to the use of "Monetary Unit Sampling", 
a method in which one pretends not to check audit values but just 
one in every n (e.g. 1000) dollars. Then the Poisson distribution 
may be used. This trick throws away most information and is as a 
result extremely conservative. 
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understood mechanism. Moreover the necessity of prior distributions 
may be the first step to the switch to Bayesian confidence 
intervals. 
In the empirical Bayesian approach (see e.g. Morris (1983)), in my 
view the ultimate solution to the problem, models are very 
important. Empirical Bayesian models are based on pooling 
information from many samples. To be able to pool, models are 
indispensable. As in many samples much information is available, 
sophisticated models may be tested, and the distributions of the 
parameters among populations may be estimated. These distributions 
are the priors for decision making in a new population. 
KKTW evaluated. 
KKTW are a perfect illustration of the arguments put forward in this 
paper. I explained why they use the simple regression model, whether 
this makes much sense is a difficult question. As the model is 
unrealistic - which they admit - justifications based on the model 
assumptions do hardly matter. The only thing that may be shown is 
that the regression model resembles in some ways the more 
appropriate "rare error regression model" given before, combined 
with priors for the distribution of the error. This is done in the 
appendix and explains why the regression procedure does not lead to 
unacceptable confidence intervals like Roberts' model. 
Apart from these considerations, the only thing we know is that for 
most of the Neter populations the resulting confidence intervals, 
meant to cover the true value in 95% of the cases, cover in f act 
(for n=100, KKTW table 3, populations 1,2 and 3) the true value in 
78% to 100% of the cases , the higher percentages oecurring for low 
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error rates. This illustrates the impossibility of uniformly valid 
answers. It will be clear that this type of messy answer is of 
little help once one must make a statement knowing only the sample 
outcome. 
The consequences of concentration on the wrong questions go further. 
Even if all interval would have 95% coverage, we still would not 
know how often a population with an unacceptable error rate passes 
the tests, nor how often an acceptable population is rejected. A 
good evaluation of errors of the first and second kind is the first 
thing one would expect. The confusion is further illustrated by the 
fact that KKTW and I even differ in opinion on how the confidence 
intervals should be used, as mentioned before. 
A connection between Bayesian and classical viewpoints could have 
been established if KKTW had presented their simulation results 
differently. For each of the Neter populations, errors of the first 
and second kind resulting from application of the confidence 
intervals, could have been given. From such tables, classical 
acceptable minimax decision rules as well as Bayesian rules could be 
derived. 
Still, studying the results of decision rules for the Neter 
populations remains rather barren as long as nobody has any 
Information how often the different types occur. Empirical Bayesian 
analysis is the only way to make real progress, preferably using 
models because from many equivalent population only samples become 
available in audit practice. As long as no such information is 
available the choice remains between that between subjective 
Bayesian and messy classical analysis. In that case I prefer clear 
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subjectivity, because, as this paper intended to show, classical 
analysis is very messy indeed. 
The apparent confusion in classical analysis is in my view a direct 
result of the fact that frequentist methodology does not answer the 
right question: "what is known about the error rate given the sample 
result?" That researchers, faced with the impossibility to get 
sensible answers within a paradigm, start wandering 
methodologically, is no wonder. The use of a trick, like KKTW's 
regression on all observations, that does approximately the same as 
assuming prior information but has a different and obviously wrong 
motivation, is the sad consequence of the impossible tasks classical 
statistics tries to impose upon its practitioners. 
Appendix: regression with rare errors 
to 
In this appendix it is shown that KKTW's confidence intervals based on 
regression procedures resemble Bayesian confidence intervals for a model 
with rare errors combined with priors for the parameters. 
KKTW consider regression models, where audit values (y) are regressed upon 
book values (x), not explicitly recognizing that errors are rare . 
Confidence intervals for the mean error are derived next from the 
regression results and the known mean book value. Obviously the "rare 
error regression" model 
y. = x. with probability 1-p 
y. = a + 0x. + u. with probability p (1) 
2 
u. distributed IN(0,cr ) 
does about the same, but makes more sense. Other models might even make 
more sense, but are not discussed here. The problem with this kind of 
model is that often too few errors are found to make reasonable confidence 
intervals for oc and 0. 
To simplify matters we assume that p=l. This simplification shortens the 
confidence intervals for the rare error model, which still will prove to 
be wider than those of the model 
y. = y + x. •+ v. for all observations. (2) 
1 1 1 
We define the error e.=y.-x.. m is the number of errors, n the total 
ï Ji ï 
number of observations. The mean error in the population, p. , is pa in 
model (1), and y in model (2). Both models lead to the mean error in the 
sample as estimator for fi . But the confidence intervals differ. In model 
(1) the estimator a of a has, conditional upon m, a Student distribution 
with m-1 degrees of f reedom. So the estimator m.a/n for (i has, 
conditional upon p=m/n, an associated confidence interval 
pa e n_1Ze. + vm/(m-l) t , ___ n V Ze? - m _ 1 ( I e . ) 2 (3) 
1 - m - 1 ; . 975 1 1 
The unconditional confidence interval is still wider. In model (2), the 
estimator c of y is similar to (3), but now a student distribution with 
n-1 degrees of freedom is used. Note that the sums of errors and squared 
errors remain the same; the zero errors do not contribute. So: 
"L I 
•yen he. + vn / (n - l ) t _ n V ü e ? - n - 1 ( 2 e . ) 2 (4) 
The main difference between both confidence intervals lies in the 
multiplication factors of the estimated Standard errors which is much 
higher in (3). The compensation by higher estimated Standard errors in 
(4), occurring because in (4) the squared mean error is divided by n 
instead of m will generally be small. For a zero mean error only the 
multiplication factors count. Their ratio is given in table 1. 
I 
| Table 1. 
| Ratio of multiplication factors in models (3) and (4); n=100. 
{-factors V w ( m - l ) t , _.„ and VnA n-1) t , _ „ } 
m-l;.975 n-1;. 975 
|m 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Iratio inf 9.0 2.6 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 
These differences matter strongly. A 95% confidence interval in a student 
distribution with 4 degrees of f reedom multiplied by 1.6 makes it a 997. 
confidence interval; up to m=10 similar results hold. If one moreover 
realizes that in (3) also the fraction with errors is stochastic wich 
leads to higher confidence intervals for /i (in a Bayesian context the 
intervals may easily be calculated) and that KKTW estimate /3 from (1) as 
well, which also leads to higher intervals in the rare error model 
(student distributions with m-2 degrees of f reedom), it is clear that the 
rare error model leads to much wider confidence intervals than the 
regression models. 
The fact that the rare error model leads to unacceptable results must be 
compensated by prior information. Implicitly this is done by using the 
incorrect model(2). The prior that leads to (4) as the (Bayesian) 
confidence interval may be shown to be (still conditional upon m and for 
0=1): 
, 2 . f - 2 _m , ,2 , 2^-m/2+l 
p(a,o~ ) oc exp -<<r I _ (e -a) - (er ) 
- (2Em e2)"1mZ(l-n"1)(Sm ( e / m - a ) 2 l (5) 
1=1 1 i =1 1 J 
where « stands for "is proportional with". This is a rather unusual (and 
improper) prior, with as strongest feature that for small m low values of 
er are considered likely a priori. The smaller m, the stronger this effect, 
as is to be expected from table 1. The fact that this prior is strongly 
data-dependent shows that is not compatible with any reasonable prior 
information. 
Ordinary regression is thus shown to be a badly specified Bayesian rare 
error model, with as only advantage that it looks like a classical, though 
obviously inappropriate, model. Other models, with priors favoring small 
values of <r that are independent from the data, are to be preferred. Such 
models are easily constructed and there is an enormous flexibility in the 
specification. The choice of the most proper model seems in auditing only 
possible using Empirical Bayesian methods. 
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